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In his oft-quoted Fifth Report to the Massachusetts Board of Education, Hor-
ace Mann sought to popularize the idea that education had individual as well 
as collective economic benefits. This 1841 report became one of the most well 
known of Mann's twelve reports to the board, though Mann himself worried 
that such an appeal would exacerbate the materialism that he hoped the com-
mon schools would combat. At the time, however, the Massachusetts Board 
was under attack from opponents of a centralized school system, and Mann 
thought that by showing how schooling benefited the economy he might 
convince the board's opponents of the value of the state's investment in public 
education. Accordingly, he replaced his usual arguments about its moral and 
civic value with a demonstration of its monetary value to both workers and 
manufacturers in the Commonwealth. Arguing that the key to prosperity 
was an educated populace, he even sought to calculate the rate of return to 
the state's investment in education by asking a small sample of Massachusetts 
businessmen to assess the difference in productivity between literate and il-
literate workers. 
Though Mann's argument about economic efficacy helped save the Board 
of Education, until the end of the nineteenth century most common-school 
promoters continued to prioritize the civic and moral purposes of education. 
Since then, however, those ideas have been eclipsed by ones like those Mann 
articulated in his Fifth Report, particularly about the school's role in the pro-
duction of what we now call human capital. Arguments about the school's 
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civic and moral purposes have not disappeared, of course. They appear regu-
larly on political leaders' lists of desirable educational goals. But over the last 
hundred years those ideas have been increasingly subordinated to the notion 
that the primary purpose of education is to equip students with the skills they 
presumably need to improve their own economic opportunities and to make 
the nation more prosperous and secure. 
Nowhere has the influence of this way of thinking about education been 
more evident than in the history of federal education policy. It is especially evi-
dent today, for example, in programs like President Barack Obama's Race to the 
Top Fund, which explicitly links federal aid to his desire to restore the nation's 
competitive edge in the international marketplace. But the influence of ideas 
about human capital formation on federal education policy began nearly a cen-
tury ago when they provided the chief justification for passage of the Smith-
Hughes Vocational Education Act in 1917. And they have provided the main 
rationale for nearly all the federal government's most important educational 
initiatives ever since-including the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) 
in 1958, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965, and, 
most recently, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001. Indeed, given the 
longstanding opposition to federal involvement in education, it's hard to imag-
ine that these programs could have passed on any other terms. 
Taken together, these initiatives helped justify the expansion of elemen-
tary and secondary education to working-class youth, immigrants, women, 
and people of color as well. As a result, the public high school today is more 
inclusive than it was at the end of the nineteenth century when it graduated 
only 3 percent of the eligible age group. Yet, if the programs spawned by the 
federal interest in developing human capital contributed to the democratiza-
tion of secondary schools, they have also had less desirable consequences. 
They seldom provided the economic benefits their proponents promised, but 
operated instead to displace economic anxieties onto the schools, deflecting 
attention from the need for more assertive labor market polices. At the same 
time, they protected the educational advantages of the nation's most affluent 
and privileged citizens. This is true even though the conception of equal op-
portunity that has informed them has actually grown more robust over time 
as policy has shifted from a focus on teaching specific vocational skills to 
working-class and immigrant youth to a focus on equipping all students-
rich and poor alike-with the cognitive skills that a more fluid, knowledge-
based economy presumably requires. 
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Consider, for example, the movement for vocational education that cul-
minated with the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act, the first major program 
of federal assistance to public education. In the first two decades of the twen-
tieth century, no other reform attracted such a broad spectrum of supporters 
or generated such high expectations for success. Business executives, labor 
unions, social reformers, as well as many educators all argued that vocational 
training in schools, particularly trade and industrial education, would be an 
antidote to poverty, youth unemployment, and the threat of national eco-
nomic decline. Yet even allowing for the rhetorical oversell that usually ac-
companies new programs, the payoff to investment in vocational education 
fell far short of what proponents assumed it would be. Not only did gradu-
ates seldom find jobs in the areas for which they had been trained, but most 
evaluations of vocational programs found that on average their graduates 
earned no more than graduates from the regular course of study. Indeed, 
most evaluations concluded that vocational education functioned mainly, in 
the words of one 1938 report, as a "dumping ground" for working-class and 
immigrant youth who had been pushed out of the labor market and pulled 
into school by tougher enforcement of child labor and compulsory education 
laws but whom educators did not think were capable of doing more advanced 
academic work. 
It is important not to overstate these failures. Some young people did 
benefit from vocational education. Yet even in cases where it helped them get 
jobs, it ultimately did as much to harden as to reduce class and racial dispari-
ties in schools and in the labor market. Commercial education courses, for 
example, provided working- and middle-class young women a path out of 
domesticity into paid labor, and, in some cities, trade and technical schools 
provided a small number of immigrant and working-class boys with access 
to the more privileged sectors of the blue-collar work force, where techni-
cal skills were highly valued. That, however, is also why vocational educators 
typically excluded African American and Latino youth. They were channeled 
into courses in the "trowel trades" and domestic work or, as they began to 
attend high school in greater numbers, placed in the general education track 
that prepared them for neither work nor college. 
Theoretically, of course, school officials and political leaders could have 
adopted policies that expanded access to the labor market by encouraging all 
students to enroll in courses that would prepare them for college, even if they 
were unlikely to go beyond high school. That was what the National Education 
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Association Committee of Ten had recommended in 1893 and what some 
policy makers recommend today. But at the turn of the century most edu-
cators rejected this idea. They believed it was inefficient and undemocratic 
because it didn't help students adjust to the demands of society and denied 
those headed for working-class jobs the same opportunity to prepare for 
their likely future occupations that the academic curriculum had long offered 
to middle-class youth bound for college and the professions. Once we rec-
ognize that the academic course of study was becoming more tightly linked 
to the most desirable jobs, however, the assumption that working-class stu-
dents were more suited for vocational than academic study appears less as 
an expression of democracy than as a way for a relatively elite population to 
preserve access to college and subsequently to managerial and professional 
positions-at a time when students from poor and working-class families 
pressed for access of their own. 
Partly for these reasons, vocational education fell out of favor. But the 
assumptions about human capital formation that informed it continued to 
shape educational policy long after enthusiasm for it had dimmed. Following 
the Second World War, for example, the Cold War inspired a shift in policy 
interest from preparing working-class young people for working-class jobs 
to providing equal opportunity for the development of high-level technical 
skills to counter the threat of Soviet technical superiority. A concern with na-
tional security, heightened by the launching of Sputnik, made it possible for 
many members of Congress to overcome their fear that federal involvement 
in education would erode the power of local school boards, thereby paving 
the way for the passage of the NDEA in 1958. "The present emergency:' it 
declared, "demands that additional and more adequate educational oppor-
tunities be made available:' Nonetheless, although its investment in support 
for mathematics, science, and foreign language instruction provided some fi-
nancial heft to efforts already in place, the NDEA did little to create a serious 
intellectual experience for the vast majority of high school students. Its main 
concern was "to identify and educate more of the talent of our Nation:' Con-
sequently, it invested in both testing to determine who had the most talent 
and in guidance that would direct those students to challenging courses-
and to college. 
This agenda meshed perfectly with the proposals ofJames Bryant Conant's 
highly influential The American High School Today (1959). Published a year 
after Congress passed the NDEA, its affirmation of the comprehensive high 
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school served as a blueprint for school districts across the country. Although 
Conant believed that all students needed a core of academic subjects, he 
maintained that there should be ability grouping and then a high-level aca-
demic track for the top 15 percent and a vocational track for those deemed 
to have limited academic talent. In harmony with the spirit ofNDEA, he was 
committed to a broader view of equality of opportunity than earlier advo-
cates of vocational education. He wanted to ensure that students who had 
high scores on aptitude tests did not choose the vocational track and that 
schools did not succumb to the pressure of affluent parents to place modestly 
talented students in a curriculum that was too advanced for them. This idea 
of equality as meritocracy made it possible, to use Thomas Jefferson's phrase, 
to rake some diamonds from the rubbish, enabling some outstanding stu-
dents from disadvantaged backgrounds to get superior educations. Neither 
NDEA nor Conant, however, had anything to say about how socioeconomic 
differences produced test-score inequalities that were then reproduced by 
placement in the different tracks of the comprehensive high school. 
The Cold War not only inspired the development of human capital to 
compete with the Soviet Union scientifically, but also inspired a concern to 
improve the image of American democracy in competition with the Soviet 
Union for the loyalties of people in Africa, Asia, and South America. The 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) satisfied this 
ideological concern by appearing to demonstrate that American democracy 
would no longer tolerate racial segregation. NDEA, however, paid no atten-
tion to matters of racial inequality. In fact, it passed only because propo-
nents allayed the fears of Southern Congress members that greater federal 
involvement in education would lead to interference with their segregated 
institutions. 
In contrast to the meritocratic emphasis of NDEA, which actually re-
inforced race and class inequalities in education, federal policy since 1960, 
beginning with Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 1965, has tried to address these inequalities. Inspired by the civil rights 
movement, Title I signaled a shift from the international focus of the Cold 
War to a domestic focus on poverty-the realm Commissioner of Educa-
tion Francis Keppel called our "nearest foreign country:' In introducing the 
legislation that became the centerpiece of the Great Society and the war on 
poverty, President Lyndon Johnson stated, "Poverty has many roots, but the 
taproot is ignorance:' The solution was to provide funding to schools with 
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concentrations of the poor in order to "contribute particularly to meeting 
the special needs of educationally deprived children:' In this way the poor 
would be able to accumulate the human capital necessary to find employ-
ment, which would enable them to escape from poverty. 
In addition to distracting attention from the ways labor market inadequa-
cies contributed to poverty, there were two major problems with Title 1. First, 
despite an initial investment of slightly more than one billion dollars, the po-
litical viability of the program depended on the wide distribution of its funds. 
As a result, more than nine in every ten school districts ultimately shared the 
money, making it impossible to concentrate significant resources in the schools 
and districts with the largest number of poor students. Second, the practice of 
Title I was governed by the conviction that poor children, especially if they 
were African American or Latino, were hampered in school because they had 
cultural deficits that required compensatory education. Although Title I did 
not specify interventions, the typical practice emphasized pullout programs 
that focused on low-level skills to make up for what students presumably 
lacked-and this required them to miss regular classroom instruction. 
These limitations became evident once evaluations were conducted. Early 
on, most of these evaluations found few positive effects. Some studies even 
found that the achievement of students in the program declined, though this 
was partly because of the wide dispersal of funding. Later evaluations, con-
ducted once funds were better targeted to the students they were intended to 
help, were somewhat more encouraging, but they still paled in comparison to 
the program's original promise to help poor children escape from poverty. By 
the early 1980s, most concluded that the major benefit of the program was to 
keep the achievement gap between rich and poor students from getting worse. 
Only modestly redistributive and built on the assumption that poor chil-
dren were deficient rather than that schools were organized to hinder their 
capacity, Title I was a poor substitute for the more capacious view of equality 
of educational opportunity that integration promised. But because it distrib-
uted its funds so widely, it generated a broad constituency of support from 
new groups of service providers and recipients, both Republicans and Demo-
crats in Congress, and education interest groups like the National Education 
Association, which rallied to defend the program whenever it was attacked. 
As a result, Title I turned out to be remarkably resilient, despite its relatively 
slight impact on student achievement. It survived Ronald Reagan's attempt to 
turn it into a block grant in 1981, and it continues to be the chief mechanism 
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distributing federal dollars to the schools, which it does according to the 
premises put in place in 1965. 
Whereas Title I was motivated by a desire to use education to help chil-
from low-income families escape what Lyndon Johnson referred to as 
the "cycle of poverty:' the movement that culminated with the passage of the 
NCLB in 200l had little to do with fighting poverty. It was motivated instead 
a desire to upgrade the quality of the nation's labor force and thereby in-
crease the capacity of its businesses to compete in the international market-
place. But as with the Great Society's poverty warriors, the businesspeople, 
politicians, educators, and other social reformers who fretted about the na-
tion's lagging economic performance never questioned the idea that the solu-
tion to the problems they faced lay primarily with strategies of educational 
reform aimed at the development of human capital. 
At the outset, NCLB did appear to embrace a more robust vision of equal 
opportunity than Title I of ESEA. Rather than trying to change the character 
oflow-income children, as Title I seemed interested in doing, NCLB aimed 
to change the schools. By providing test score data to compare schools with 
students from different backgrounds and sanctioning those that did not bring 
all groups up to a minimum standard of academic achievement, NCLB coun-
tered the idea that low-income children and children of color were somehow 
incapable of achieving. Instead, it promised to offer proof that schools and 
educational practices, not children and their parents, were to blame for ra-
cially and economically disparate outcomes. It then promised to press inade-
quate schools to address those disparities. 
But this vision of reform was even more pinched than the preceding one. 
It rightly rejected the array of stigmatizing practices that accompanied ear-
lier compensatory programs and that had long depressed the educational 
achievement oflow-income children. In doing so, however, it also minimized 
the idea that there was any connection between the conditions of educa-
tional provision and school achievement, let alone that equality required the 
redistribution of income. By setting uniform standards for all students and 
holding local schools accountable for meeting them, it sought instead to dis-
cipline teachers and administrators to raise achievement levels regardless of 
the often great disparities of resources available in different schools. 
Over the last decade, the limits of this strategy have become all too 
apparent. Touted as a program to reduce the achievement gap so that all 
students would have an equal chance to acquire the academic skills needed in 
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the twenty-first-century economy, NCLB was rarely effective. Most often, it 
functioned to protect the educational advantages of the most privileged, just 
as federal policy has done so often in the past. This time, however, the famil-
iar result didn't come about because educators formally limited access to the 
most challenging academic classes or because they isolated poor students in 
pullout classrooms. It was because teachers and administrators in low-income 
city schools faced the impossible requirement of annual increases in the test 
scores of multiple subgroups-including special education students-so that 
all of them attained the same level of proficiency. In order to meet this goal 
and avoid the NCLB's penalties for failure, these educators focused narrowly 
on preparation for the tests in reading and mathematics at the expense of other 
subjects. In contrast, their counterparts in middle-class suburban schools, con-
fident that their students could succeed on the tests without special prepara-
tion, continued to offer an enriched curriculum. In this way, the disaggregation 
of test scores by subgroup, which was the legislation's most progressive feature, 
actually worked to produce less than progressive results. 
Though the rhetoric around NCLB was all about eliminating the achieve-
ment gap between rich and poor, any program that directly attacked the 
sources of the educational advantages of affluent over poor children was un-
likely to have won political support. As a result, NCLB focused on saving the 
children in urban schools while leaving the district lines that protected the 
suburban schools and their mostly white, middle-class students intact. 
None of this long history has done much to dampen enthusiasm among 
policy makers today for developing human capital in schools as a way to 
solve the economic challenges facing the nation and to equalize educational 
opportunity. Economic problems, such as stagnant wages and rising income 
inequality, for example, have more to do with the absence of strong labor 
market institutions, the adoption of regressive tax policies, and the social 
norms that enable vast accumulations of wealth for a few than they do with 
the quantity and quality of education students receive. Yet the commitment 
to addressing these problems through ostensibly better education policies 
not only remains unabated, but, if anything, has been enhanced by the now 
commonly held belief that the economy's shortcomings stem from too much 
government intervention rather than too little. In this environment, a "supply-
side" strategy like human capital formation has particular appeal, even to 
many of those who were once skeptical about it. 
Some of Obama's supporters hoped he might chart a different course. But 
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his vision of education policy has done little to alter these preferences. His 
call for the nation to "out-educate" our international competitors continues 
to assign to the schools responsibility for solving problems that are beyond 
educational correction while the policies he has adopted-such as Race to 
the Top-pose no challenge to the jurisdictional arrangements that have long 
protected the educational advantages of the affluent. Instead, following the 
trajectory set in motion by NCLB, they are confined to the technical prob-
lems of how to manage schools better, measure achievement more precisely, 
encourage teachers to work harder, and manipulate incentives to stimulate 
the growth of charter schools. 
No less than when Horace Mann wrote his Fifth Report, Obama's strategy 
might be the only way in the current political climate to win backing for 
more spending on education. But the history of past policy suggests that we 
have paid a steep price for it. We should be thinking instead about how we 
might establish conditions both inside and outside the schools that will en-
gage students in the kind of serious intellectual work that the Committee of 
Ten called for more than a century ago, rather than pursuing policies that 
will only add another dimension of inequality to an already unequal system. 
